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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHARON KAY REDDISH, : 
Applicant/Appellant, : Case No. 
vs. : 
SENTINEL CONSUMER PRODUCTS : 
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION : 
FUND OF UTAH and SECOND INJURY 
FUND, : 
Defendants/Respondents: 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is 
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 7 8-
2(a)-3(2a), Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as amended 1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission reviewing panel erred in finding that although the 
Applicant continued to receive medical attention after December 
16, 1987, following her injury on November 4, 1986 and was not 
released to return to work by her attending physician at any time 
prior to the Administrative Hearing in this matter which was held 
on June 3, 1987, she was not entitled to temporary total 
disability payments for that period. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a Petition for Review of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order of the Industrial Commission, 
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denying the Appellant compensation during the time she was unable 
to work and from an Order denying a Motion for Review following a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge entered March 24, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Applicant is a 22 year old female who began working 
for Sentinel Consumer Products at their plant in Ogden, Utah in 
late September of 1986. Her basic job was to work as an Operator 
on a cottonball machine where she worked as a bagger on a line 
next to machinery which was raised some two or three feet above 
the floor. 
On November 4, 1986, Applicant was required to leave her 
position and stand on a catwalk which was approximately five and 
one-half feet off the ground to load tampons into a machine. 
During the day and while walking along the catwalk, 
Applicant caught her foot in a space in the catwalk floor and 
fell. Her body did not strike the ground, but bent her legs and 
back in an awkward position. 
The Applicant was advised by her Supervisor to go home 
and to immediately seek medical care. The Applicant first 
consulted Dr. Gailen E. Lundel, a Chiropractic Doctor, who took 
x-rays and advised the Applicant to remain off her feet for 
several days and not return to work. 
The Applicant also sought the opinion from Dr. Clayton 
Gabbert, an Orthopedic Surgeon, who concurred in the ciagnosis 
that she should remain off her feet and not return to worK» 
Applicant also sought the advise of Dr. L. Michael 
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Janeway, an Orthopedic Surgeon, who following the examination 
prescribed intense physical therapy which has been provided over 
a period of time by Lili Hall at St. Benedicts Hospital and also 
advised her not to return to work. 
Dr. Janeway continued to monitor the Applicant throughout 
a period of time during December 16, 1986 through May of 1987. 
In his last Industrial Commission report, dated May 28, 1987, Dr. 
Janeway still indicated that Applicant was not released to return 
to work and continued to require therapy. 
During this period of time, Applicant was also seen by 
Dr. Edward Spencer at the request of the Workman's Compensation 
Fund, who found that she was not impaired and could return to 
work. Even following this report, Dr. Janeway, her attending 
physician, however continued to maintain that she was not 
medically able to return to work and therapy was appropriate. 
Following the hearing before the Administrative Law 
Judge, the Applicant was seen by the medical panel which was Dr. 
Nathaniel Nord. Dr. Nord found that the Applicant was not 
temporary or totally disabled after December 16, 1986, but found 
that the medical expenses which consisted of the therapy 
prescribed by Dr. Janeway and other medical expenses which was 
incurred were reasonable and should be paid. (See Record on 
Appeal - Medical Panel Report) 
The Applicant's symptoms were episodic headaches which 
began in the neck and spread over the entire cranium; shooting 
pains similar to muscle spasms throughout the back and lower 
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extremities; had numbness in her legs, feet and arms0 These were 
described by her as on-going and present as late as the June 3, 
1987 hearing, (See T.p. of Administrative Hearing June 3, 1987) 
Applicant did not return to work during the entire period 
from the time of the accident on November 4, 1986 through the 
time of the hearing on June 3, 1987 and was not released for work 
by her attending physician at that time, nor did he ever indicate 
that she was medical stable at any time. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
A hearing was held on June 3, 1987 before the Honorable 
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge, at which time 
Appellant was present and presented her case requesting temporary 
total disability compensation after December 16, 1986 and for 
payment of medical expenses. 
The Judge ordered a medical panel and following the 
completion of the medical panel, the Court issued its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on January 21, 19 88 which 
denied the Applicant temporary total disability after December 
16, 1987, but allowed for the payment of medical expenses 
incurred after that date. 
The Applicant filed a timely Motion for Review with the 
Industrial Commission on February 1, 1988. The Industrial 
Commission denied the Motion for Review on March 24, 1988 and it 
is from the original decision of the Administrative Law Judge and 
the denial of the Motion for Review that the Applicant now 
appeals. Said appeal having been filed on April 25, 1988c 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT APPLICANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS 
FROM THE PERIOD OF THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT 
UNTIL SHE WAS ABLE TO RETURN TO WORK 
This case raises a perplexing issue for the Applicant. 
There is no question that in the Administrative proceedings 
below, it was determined clearly that the Applicant was injured 
in an industrial related accident on November 4, 1986. Both her 
own physicians and the independent examiner, Dr. Edward Spencer 
and the medical panel, Dr. Nathaniel Nord, found that Applicant 
did sustain an industrial accident and there was a medically 
demonstrable causal connection between the problems complained 
of, which consisted of back pains, tenderness of the dorsal 
lumber spine, numbness of the left hand and lower extremities and 
constant headaches. (See Record on Appeal, medical panel report) 
There is also no question that none of the physicians 
involved in the case, including Applicant's own physician, Dr. L. 
Michael Janeway, independent physician, Dr. Spencer and the 
medical panel, Dr. Nord, found that Applicant had sustained a 
permanent injury of any type. 
Where the disparity lies in this case and Applicant 
believes the essential unfairness, is that the Administrative Law 
Judge and the Commission adopted the finding that although 
Applicant had been injured on November 4, 1986, that by December 
16, 1986 she was medically stabilized and although her own 
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treating physician did not release her to return to work and 
although she was unable to work during the ensuing months up to 
the date of the Administrative Hearing on June 3, 1987 and 
therefore, received no compensation, she was not to be 
compensated on the basis that she had been temporarily disabled. 
On the other hand however, the Commission found that all 
the medical expenses primarily occasioned by the therapy and 
other treatment requested by Dr. Janeway were compensatable. 
This seemingly contradictory decision places the 
Applicant in the unenviable position of having sustained an 
industrial injury, having been told by her treating physician 
that she cannot return to work and being placed on a regimen of 
therapy for a period of in excess of eight months and then is 
told by the Commission that although there is no disagreement 
with the therapy and it is compensatable, she is not entitled to 
any benefits to assist her because she was unable to work. 
Although the Commission cites in support of their 
decision the case of Booms v. Rapp Construction, 720 P. 2d 1363 
(Utah 1986), their decision seems to fly in the very face of that 
decision which states in part as follows: 
"Temporary total disability benefits 
are typically awarded after a worker 
suffers a job related disability that 
prevents him or her from returning to 
work. The purposes of those benefits 
is to "provide income for an employee 
during the time of recuperation from 
his injury and until his condition is 
stabilized11, quoting the case of 
Entwistle v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 395 
(Utah 1981) ff 
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This concept has been echoed in subsequent decisions, 
Grayhound Lines Inc., v. Wallace, 728 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1986) and 
Rushton v, Gelco Exp, 732 P. 2d 109 (Utah 1986). There is no 
question that one of the purposes of the Worker's Compensation 
Act in providing temporary disability as set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated Section 35-1-65, 1953 (as amended 1985) is to provide 
for a percentage of the worker's normal wage while the worker is 
recovering. Normally, this percentage is 66 2/3% in most cases. 
In support of its findings, the Commission relies on the 
language of medical stabilization in determining that even though 
the Applicant's primary treating physician, Dr. L. Michael 
Janeway did not release her for work, that because Applicant was 
medically stabilized on December 16, 1986, she was not entitled 
to further temporary disability benefits during the entire period 
of her inability to work. 
Again, in support of its decision, the Commission cites 
the Booms case above. However, the language of that case must be 
read in its entirety. 
While it is true that at 13 66 the Court indicated: 
"That the determination of the 
temporary or permanent character of a 
disability is typically made when the 
Claimant reaches medical 
stabilization." 
This is normally done in connection with making a determination 
that the worker has a permanent injury. The Court goes on to 
say: 
"Temporary total disability benefits 
are to continue until the Commission 
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determines that the disability fits 
into another disability classification 
or until benefits have been paid for 
the statutory maximum of 312 weeks. 
Every disability may be reclassified if 
the character of the disability changes 
from temporary to permanent and/or the 
character of the disability changes 
from total to partial.11 (Id at 1366) 
The Court continues in defining stabilization: 
"Stabilization means that the period of 
healing has ended and the condition of 
the Claimant will not materially 
improve. Once healing has ended, the 
permanent nature of the Claimant's 
disability can be assessed and benefits 
awarded accordingly. Once a Claimant 
reaches medical stabilization, the 
Claimant is moved from temporary to 
permanent status and he is no longer 
eligible for temporary benefits. Thus, 
the Statutes imply that at some point a 
Claimant's disability ceases to be 
temporary and should be recognized as 
permanent.f! (Id at 1367) 
Applicant strongly contends that this language in the 
Booms decision does not specifically address her particular 
situation, but if viewed in the overall context of the case, 
would suggest that the Commission has erred mightily. 
What the Court would seem to be saying in the unanimous 
Booms decision was that in every worker's compensation injury 
case, there comes a point when the injury either will become 
stabilized so that it can be evaluated as to its permanent 
character and at that point, temporary benefits cease and a 
permanent partial award is made or they will continue for a 
maximum of 312 weeks. 
It did not specifically address the situation as the 
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Applicant encountered here that it was determined by her 
attending physician and even by the medical panel that 
Applicant's condition was temporary in nature, that she could not 
return to work and required medical intervention, but that she 
did not have a permanent or permanent/partial injury of any kind. 
The Industrial Commission leap frogs over this 
circumstance and simply says, based on the Booms case that 
because the medical panel found medical stabilization, but no 
permanent injury, it is clear that no money should have been paid 
for the period she was unable to work. This is in direct 
conflict with the stated purposes of Workman's Compensation to 
provide at least two-thirds of the income during the period of 
that a person is unable to work. 
Plaintiff's circumstance is an obvious conflict, both in 
the application of the Booms case and the statute. Plaintiff 
contends that it is inconceivable that the Legislature would have 
contemplated this type of situation where a person cannot work 
and desires to be compensated for that period of time because of 
a legal semantics problem with the term medical stabilization. 
That unless there is a permanent injury, no recovery is possible. 
In this case, the medical panel did not dispute Dr. 
Janeway's diagnosis which was that as late as May 29, 1987, some 
five (5) days before Applicant's original hearing before the 
Administrative Law Judge, that the Applicant was not able to 
return to her previous job at Sentinel Consumer Products and was 
not even released for even light duty and continued to need 
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therapy. 
While this may be medical stabilization in that the 
situation was not getting any worse and seemed to have reached a 
plateau, all the doctors concurred that it was not permanent. 
Nonetheless, Applicant, through her own physician, was unable to 
return to work and unable to receive any compensation whatsoever 
since December 16, 1986, a period of in excess of six months. 
What is also interesting, is that treating physicians in 
Worker's Compensation cases are required to fill out a form 
entitled Summary of Medical Record which are normally filed on a 
monthly basis to the Commission, a copy of said form is attached 
hereto and marked Exhibit ,fAff and made a part hereof by 
reference. It is interesting to note that nowhere on the form is 
the physician required to answer the question, "has the Applicant 
reached medical stabilization?11 He is required to consider 
whether or not the individual can be released for their usual 
work or for light duty and to discuss whether or not there is a 
permanent injury» 
The Commission's allowance of the Applicant's medical 
expenses for the period of December 16, 1986 through June 3, 
1987, further complicates the matter. These expenses were 
primarily for the visits to Dr. Janeway and the therapy conducted 
by a Therapist at the McKay Dee Hospital, based upon the 
diagnosis and instructions for treatment from Dr. Janeway. 
The Applicant recognizes that the appropriate standard of 
review in these types of cases is that set forth in Rushton v. 
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Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986) in which the Court states 
its clear position that it will not disturb findings and orders 
of the Industrial Commission unless they are arbitrary and 
capricious and that they are arbitrary and capricious when they 
are contrary to the evidence or without reasonable basis in the 
evidence. 
It is Applicant's position that this is a case of 
arbitrariness and capriciousness based on the evidence, because 
the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission, in relying only 
on a portion of the Booms rationale has carved out a particular 
type of situation wherein in effect, there is no recovery 
possible for any injured employee in the situation where 
Applicant found herself and that this is contrary to the intent 
of the Legislature and contrary to the Booms case. 
In effect, it is Applicant's position that under the 
totality of the evidence, if she is not able to work at the 
position where she was employed at the time of the injury and was 
not released for other types of work. In a situation where 
Applicant has no permanent or permanent partial injury which can 
be assessed, then Applicant is not medically stabilized under the 
Commission's own definition. 
There was ample evidence submitted in both the report of 
the independent physician and the medical panel which was not in 
conflict with Dr. Janeway's basic diagnosis that the lower back 
problems, and the numbness in the lower extremities were a direct 
result of the November 4, 1986 injury and required continual 
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therapy during the period of December 16, 1986 through June 3, 
1987. 
It is Applicant's contention that where all medical 
parties involved in this case agreed that there was no permanent 
injury, but also agreed that she could not have returned to work 
and required medical treatment during the aforesaid period, that 
the only reasonable interpretation is that in this particular 
type of case medical stabilization has not occurred and payment 
for the period, until she is allowed to return to work by either 
her own treating physician or the medical panel at the time of 
his analysis, that she is entitled to benefits for that period. 
ARGUMENT 
That failure to make such an order in this case was 
clearly arbitrary and capricious as it was based on an moment 
interpretation of the Booms v. Rapp decision and if this Court 
finds that it was not, then the Booms decision must be clarified 
to deal with this particular type of situation, because it was 
not specifically addressed in the context of that case and such a 
clarification should result, in light of the Legislative fiat in 
this area, to the benefit of the Applicant. 
CONCLUSION 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission erred in disallowing Applicant's request for temporary 
benefits for the total time she was unable to return to work from 
the date of the injury, November 4, 1986, until June 3, 1987. 
That the Commission erroneously applied language in the Booms v. 
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Rapp case to a situation which was either not contemplated 
therein. 
This Court should either expand the definition of medical 
stabilization to include this type of situation wherein the 
Applicant is clearly not able to work, but does not have a 
permanent injury, or under the analysis of the Booms case, or 
revoke the medical stabilization concept altogether and replace 
it with the terminology that is required to be addressed by all 
attending physicians in these types of cases and that is, the 
ability to return to either the job wherein the injury took 
place, or another type of job so that an Applicant is not left in 
the position of this Applicant, of being advised not to return to 
work, being medically treated for the same, which medical 
treatment was approved, but then not compensated for a period of 
in excess of six (6) months. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this W X / d^Y o f August, 1988. 
J0HNK5J CAINE 
Attorney for Applicant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing Brief to the counsel for the 
Defendants, James Black, Attorney at Law, 261 East^jT^pOxSouth, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage p^pajid this _2 day of 
August, 1988 
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P. 0. Box 5800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Date of Injury^ 
Employer 
SUMMARY OF MEDICAL RECORD 
(To be completed by treating physician) 
RE: Permanent Impairment Evaluation for ) /h tyt^  tf^) 
/ Name of Applicant 
1. Has applicant been released for usual work? H 7? What date? 
2. Has applicant been released for light duty? fcf? What date?_ 
3. Has applicant a permanent injury? If so, describe fully 
4. In case of permanent injury, on what date did or will the applicant reach 
a final state of recovery? ~ 
5. If there is a permanent injury, give your estimate of impairment in terms 
of percentage of loss of function: —• 
6. Is there a medically demonstrated causal relationship between the 
industrial accident and the problems you have been treating? A ^ ^ V Please 
explain as necessaryL M^>A /T-^-^-c-i^^ 
7. What future medjciy. treatment will be required as a result ofxt>he 
industrial accident? /yf / * P —^ /""""** /* f> 
8. What is the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to 
previously-existing conditions, whether due to accidental injury, disease or 
congenital causes? 
9. What is the applicant's total physical impairment, if any, resulting from 
all causes and conditions, including the industrial injury? 
10. Did the industrial injury aggravate the applicant's pre-existing 
condition? Please explain as necessary. 
Dated this ^ day oip\^ \f 1 
1 Physician's Name (Please Print) 
ysician1s Signature 
s*>-
Street Address 
City and State 
